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ABOLITION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR THE CONTENTS OF
PREEXISTING DOCUMENTS: UNITED
STA TEs v DoE
N the fall of 1980 a federal grand jury in Hudson County, New Jersey,
began an investigation into corruption in the awarding of county and
municipal contracts. A portion of the investigation centered on several
companies that did business with various entities of the local government.
Mr. Milton Reid (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Doe")' allegedly oper-
ated all these companies as sole proprietorships. In November and De-
cember of 1980 the grand jury served five subpoenas duces tecum on Mr.
Doe, ordering him to appear before the grand jury and produce certain
business records. The subpoenas were broad, and the types of business
records sought included such things as accounting ledgers and journals,
copies of bills and invoices, bank statements and cancelled checks, names
and home addresses of employees, phone company statements, and safe
deposit box records. In response, Mr. Doe filed a motion in federal district
court to quash the subpoenas. The district court for the District of New
Jersey granted the motion to quash except with respect to those documents
and records required by law to be kept or disclosed to a public agency,
such as tax returns and W-2 statements. 2 The court reasoned that a sole
proprietor may take advantage of the fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination 3 and that, in this case, the act of producing the docu-
1. The district court's report referred to him as Mr. Reid. In re Grand Jury Empanel-
led March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. I (D.N.J. 1981). He subsequently requested anonymity.
In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 328 n.l (3d Cir. 1982).
2. In reGrand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981). The
Supreme Court first established the "required records doctrine" in Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948). There the Court held that the fifth amendment does not protect
records that are required to be kept by law and that serve a valid administrative purpose.
Id. Later cases have clarified and limited the doctrine so that it now applies only to records
required by statutes that are not aimed at select groups inherently suspect of criminal activ-
ity. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
601 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 14.05, at 265-71 (1980) (discussion of the statutory compulsion of records and cases that
seek to reconcile the fifth amendment privilege with the legislature's legitimate goal of en-
acting regulatory legislation).
3. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.N.J. 1981).
Other business entities, such as corporations, unincorporated associations, and partnerships,
cannot protect their records by invoking the fifth amendment privilege. Id.
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ments had communicative aspects warranting that protection.4 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision5 and dis-
cussed at length the application of fifth amendment protection to the con-
tents of documents.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded- The fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination does not protect the business records
of a sole proprietorship, but it may protect the act of producing such
records, and the production can be compelled only with a formal grant of
statutory use immunity. United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 79 L. Ed. 2d
552 (1984).
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS
Constitutional protection against self-incrimination derives from the
fifth amendment, which states: "[N]o person ...shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ,,7 This protection
began in England in the 12th century with the struggle against the ecclesi-
astical courts' inquisitorial procedures,8 which were designed to compel
the subjects of an investigation to confess their own guilt.9 The privilege
against self-incrimination, as well as the history of the struggle to achieve
the privilege, came to the United States as part of its common law heritage
and was incorporated into the Constitution in the Bill of Rights.' 0
In interpreting the right against self-incrimination the Supreme Court
has held that the fifth amendment must be construed broadly in favor of
the right it was intended to protect."l Consequently, a witness may claim
fifth amendment protection against a threat of incrimination whenever his
reply might provide any link in the evidentiary chain necessary to convict
him.' 2 Use of the fifth amendment has not been limited to criminal trials,
but has been extended to any governmental proceeding in which a person's
4. Id. at 3.
5. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327, 328 (3d Cir. 1982).
6. Id. at 331-34.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974).
9. Id. Typically, although the accused was not informed of the case against him, he
was required to swear to give true answers and was then interrogated for the purpose of
extracting a confession. The sworn statement to tell the truth became known as the oath ex
officio because the judge was able to demand it by virtue of his office. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 46-47 (1968). The English people bitterly resisted this oath and the
inquisition and occasional torture that accompanied it, and the ecclesiastical courts finally
abolished the oath ex offcio in 1641. Id. at 281-82. The right against self-incrimination
evolved slowly in the common law courts until it became firmly embedded in the English
judicial system. Id. at 331-32.
10. The right against self-incrimination is almost uniformly referred to as a "privilege."
This title is, however, a misnomer. Although protection from compelled self-incriminating
testimony originated in England as a common law privilege, it was made a constitutional
right in this country as part of the fifth amendment, which was ratified in 1791. Id at vii.
11. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). In Counselman the Court
stated: "The privilege ... is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Id.
12. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). The Court in Hoffman declared
that before a fifth amendment claim is disallowed it should be absolutely clear that the
testimony could not possibly tend to incriminate. Id. at 488.
1024 [Vol. 38
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. 13 The fifth
amendment privilege has been declared a personal one, available only to
natural persons.14 The protection of the privilege does not extend to orga-
nizations that have established identities independent of their individual
members or to representatives of such organizations acting in an official
capacity.' 5 Furthermore, the amendment does not protect voluntary ad-
missions, no matter how incriminating; some form of compulsion is re-
quired in order to trigger the right to assert the fifth amendment.' 6 The
last requisite element of a valid claim of the privilege is some form of
testimony inherent in the evidence compelled.17 The element of compul-
sion and the requirement that the evidence sought be testimonial in nature
have led to considerable litigation and debate over what is and is not pro-
tected by the fifth amendment.' 8
One of the earliest and most cited cases interpreting what constitutes
compelled testimony protected by the fifth amendment is Boyd v. United
States.19 In that case Boyd was served with a subpoena duces tecum de-
manding the production of an invoice that the authorities thought would
help prove that Boyd had failed to pay the duty on a shipment of imported
13. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973) (fifth amendment protects
grand jury witnesses from compelled self-incrimination); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
458 (1966) (fifth amendment protects any accused subjected to custodial interrogation by
law enforcement officials); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (fifth amend-
ment protects witnesses in congressional investigations).
14. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
15. Id. at 701; see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94-96 (1974) (fifth amend-
ment does not apply to business partnerships); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72
(1951) (fifth amendment does not apply to associations); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 382 (1911) (fifth amendment does not apply to corporations).
16. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
17. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The Court in Schmerber said:
"We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature." 1d; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (participation in
lineup not testimonial); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting sam-
ple not testimonial).
18. Eg., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 (1976) (disclosures on tax returns
not compelled if fifth amendment right not asserted on the returns); United States v. Dion-
sio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (voice exemplar not testimonial in nature so subpoena of it for
identification purposes not unconstitutional); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329
(1973) (evidence not protected by fifth amendment if compulsion not directed at person
against whom evidence will be used).
See generally C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, §§ 14.05-.06, at 264-80 (discussing in depth
the compulsion and testimonial evidence requirements). The requirements that the evidence
sought be testimonial in nature and compelled by the state are particularly difficult to apply
to cases in which the privilege is asserted to protect the contents of documents. Documents
generally are compiled before their production as evidence is sought to be compelled, and
information revealed by documents is less clearly testimony than are words spoken by a
witness. Consequently, some commentators view the decisions that protect compelled dis-
closure of the contents of documents as being largely policy-based rather than having a basis
in a literal interpretation of the fifth amendment. See McKenna, The Constitutional Protec-
tion of Private Papers. The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 59 &
n.22 (1977-1978); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384-85 (1977).
19. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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glass. The Court held that the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth amendment's self-incrimi-
nation clause protect a person's private papers. 20 Thus, the Supreme Court
in Boyd held that a major basis for the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination was concern for individual privacy and property rights.2'
Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd explicitly drew books and papers into
the fifth amendment's range of protection against compelled self-incrimi-
nating testimony, stating that the Court did not view the seizure of books
and papers that could be used as evidence against a person as substantially
different from compelling a person to testify against himself.22 This analy-
sis would protect as compelled testimony books and papers entered into
evidence over a witness's objection whether those papers were acquired
under the compulsion of a subpoena or with a search warrant.23
Courts and commentators generally agree that the fundamental goal of
the privilege against self-incrimination is preservation of the adversarial or
accusatorial, as opposed to inquisitorial, nature of the criminal justice sys-
tem.24 The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly in the years since Boyd
20. Id. at 634-35. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Boydestablished in this country an interpretation of the right to be
free from governmental search and seizure which was based on private property rights. This
rationale was adopted from the English case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Tri-
als 1029, 1063-68 (1765), wherein Lord Camden reasoned that searches of private property
violated the supremacy of the owner's property rights. Bradley, Constitutional Protectionfor
Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1981). The private property basis
first stated in Boyd became better known as the "mere evidence rule." Under the mere
evidence rule only contraband or fruits and instrumentalities of a crime were subject to
seizure because these were the only items in which the individual did not have a property
interest superior to that of the state. This protection of private property also functioned to
protect privacy in general. Id. at 465-66. The mere evidence rule was abolished in Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967), which held that the fourth amendment permits
searches for mere evidence. Warden and the cases following it have significantly broadened
the scope of what may be permissibly searched for upon a proper showing of probable cause
and specificity. Bradley, supra, at 462.
21. 116 U.S. at 630.
22. Id. at 633. Boyd's close identification of fourth amendment searches and seizures
and the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination has resulted in much debate
and confusion over how best to analyze the case and its progeny. Compare Gerstein, The
Demise of Boyd.- Self Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 343, 356-73 (1979) (discussing the problems resulting from Boyd's analysis that a com-
bination of the fourth and fifth amendments protected private books and papers), with Brad-
ley, supra note 20, at 465 (analyzing Boyd as drawing a clear distinction between the fourth
and fifth amendment bases of protection of private papers), and Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Ffth Amendments, 90
HARV. L. REV. 945, 955-56 (1977) (viewing Boyd's analysis as merely highlighting the signif-
icant overlap in protection provided by the two amendments).
23. See Note, supra note 22, at 945-46.
24. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, at 255; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 295 n.l (McNaughton rev. 1961); cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (due process case). Under an inquisitorial criminal justice system the
government may interrogate the accused in order to establish its case against him. Under an
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that underlying that goal is the protection of privacy.25 One of the ways
the concern for privacy has manifested itself in fifth amendment jurispru-
dence is the Supreme Court's repeated statements that papers are protected
from forced disclosure. 26 Recent cases, however, have attenuated the pro-
tection of privacy available under the fifth amendment. These cases are
notable for their narrow definition of what constitutes testimony as well as
for their technical conception of how compulsion must relate to the crea-
tion of the testimony and the person likely to be incriminated.
The first of these cases is Schmerber v. California.27 In Schmerber the
petitioner was arrested for drunk driving and taken to a hospital. There a
police officer directed a physician to withdraw a blood sample from the
petitioner in order to test chemically for intoxication. The petitioner was
subsequently tried on charges of driving while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor. The trial court allowed introduction of the blood analy-
sis report despite the petitioner's fifth amendment objection. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that in order for the fifth amendment to protect
the accused, the evidence sought must be of a testimonial or communica-
tive nature.28 The Court further held that an involuntary blood test did
not constitute such compelled testimonial evidence.29 After refusing to
equate blood obtained involuntarily from an accused's body with com-
pelled testimony, the Court conceded that the line between testimonial evi-
accusatorial system such interrogation, even under judicial safeguards, is forbidden. The
government must carry the burden of proving its charge against the accused by evidence
independently obtained through investigations. Id.
25. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (the privilege respects a
private sanctum of feeling and thought); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
(fifth amendment creates a zone of privacy); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964) (the privilege respects the right to a private enclave). But see Gerstein, supra note 22,
at 345-56 (the author details his contention that the historical purpose of the privilege is the
preservation of the moral autonomy of the individual and that all other policies are pro-
tected only when they effect that goal). In Murphy Justice Goldberg espoused an exhaustive
and eloquent listing of the policies generally held to underlie the right against self-
incrimination:
It [the privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those sus-
pected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of crimi-
nal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhu-
mane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load"... ; our respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individ-
ual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"... ; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
26. Eg., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 330 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
27. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).




dence and physical evidence might be hard to draw. 30 Nevertheless, while
the Court seemed to be mandating a narrow definition of testimony, 3' the
majority expressly rejected the view that the privilege is limited to testi-
mony extracted from a person's own lips32 and expressly approved the
continued validity of Boyd by stating that one's papers are privileged testi-
monial communications. 33 Despite its continuation of protection for pri-
vate papers, the Court's refusal to protect physical invasion of the human
body dealt a blow to Boyd's broad privacy-based fifth amendment
protections. 34
Seven years after Schmerber the Supreme Court considered the breadth
of the privacy basis of the fifth amendment in Couch v. United States.35 In
Couch a taxpayer challenged a summons issued to her accountant that de-
manded production of the taxpayer's records. The accountant had posses-
sion of the records because he had used them in preparing the taxpayer's
income tax returns. Couch addressed the question of whether a taxpayer's
right against self-incrimination protects her personal tax records when
their production is demanded of a third party who has possession of the
documents. 36 The Court expressly stated that the fifth amendment pro-
tects privacy,37 but held that the taxpayer had no legitimate expectation of
privacy because she had turned over the papers to the accountant. 38 The
Court adhered to a narrow definition of compulsion and reasoned that the
question of who compiled or held title to the records is irrelevant. 39 If the
demand to produce the records is not aimed at the person tending to be
incriminated, the compulsion element of the fifth amendment is not met,
and the records must be produced by the third party who possesses them.4 0
The Court did not overrule Boyd, but, rather, read that case to refer to
protection of papers in one's own possession.4'
30. Id. at 764.
31. Id. at 775-76 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued that an analysis of the
accused's blood is capable of communicating guilt to the court and jury. He contended that
the majority in Schmerber failed to give the fifth amendment the liberal construction that
other decisions of the Court had stated was essential in order to protect the right against self-
incrimination. Id.
32. Id. at 763 n.7 (quoting and refusing to adopt the view expressed in 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961) that the privilege "was directed at the employ-
ment of legal process to extract from theperson's own lips an admission of guilt, which would
thus take the place of other evidence" (emphasis by the Court)).
33. 384 U.S. at 763-64.
34. See id. at 775 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
36. Id. at 327.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 335-36. The Court reasoned that much of the information in the papers
would be disclosed in an income tax return and that the discretion whether to disclose cer-
tain information lay largely with the accountant rather than the taxpayer herself. Id. at 335.
39. Id. at 331, 336.
40. Id. at 336.
41. Id. at 330-31. Some commentators have read the Couch decision as significantly
narrowing the privacy rationale of Boyd. See Gerstein, supra note 22, at 374; Note, The
Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v.
United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 693 (1982). The majority in Couch, however, drew
upon earlier declarations of the Court such as Mr. Justice Holmes's statement: "'A party is
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More recently the Supreme Court analyzed the scope of fifth amend-
ment protection of documents in Fisher v. United States42 and Andresen v.
Maryland.43 In Fisher the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons re-
quiring the production of tax documents that had been prepared by the
taxpayer's accountant. The accountant had compiled the documents from
the taxpayer's personal financial records, and the taxpayer sought to avoid
the summons by claiming his fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the records were not privi-
leged because their production would not involve incriminating
testimony.44 The Court acknowledged that courts had consistently inter-
preted Boyd as preventing compelled production of incriminating docu-
ments.45 Nevertheless, the Fisher majority dealt a major blow to that
interpretation by declaring that because so much of Boyd's rationale had
been discredited, 46 the prohibition against compelled production of private
papers must be reevaluated.47 The Court concluded that the tax records at
issue were not the taxpayer's testimonial communications because they
were not prepared by the taxpayer.48 The Court also stated that since the
papers were voluntarily created, their contents could not be considered
privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.' " Couch, 409 U.S. at
328 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)).
42. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Fisher is a consolidation of two cases; factual references herein
are to the appeal of United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974).
43. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
44. 425 U.S. at 414. The records were actually in the possession of the taxpayer's attor-
ney, but the Court held that if an attorney-client relationship existed, and if the client him-
self could have refused to produce the records by claiming his fifth amendment right, then
the attorney-client privilege allowed the attorney to invoke the taxpayer's right and resist
production of the records. Thus, the relevant question was whether the documents could
have been obtained by a subpoena addressed to the taxpayer while the documents were in
his possession. 425 U.S. at 403-05.
45. Id. at 408. One of the cases the Court cited was Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85
(1974). In Beiis the Court held that a partner in a small law firm may not invoke his per-
sonal fifth amendment privilege in refusing to produce the partnership's financial records.
Id. at 101. At the same time that it further limited availability of the privilege to organiza-
tional entities, the Beiis opinion reiterated Boyd's holding that the fifth amendment protects
an individual's personal and business papers. The Court stated: "The privilege applies to
the business records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal docu-
ments containing more intimate information about the individual's private life." 1d. at 87-
88.
46. 425 U.S. at 407-09. Specifically the Court pointed out that courts had virtually
abandoned Boyd's property-based analysis of the fourth amendment whereby the govern-
ment was forbidden to seize an individual's personal property merely for evidentiary pur-
poses. Id. at 407 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967)). The Court also noted that recent decisions had allowed the seizure and use of
"testimonial" evidence. Id. at 407-08 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)).
47. 425 U.S. at 409. The majority interpreted the fifth amendment basis of Boyd as
deriving from the fourth amendment holding of that case rather than as an independent
basis for the protection of private documents. They concluded, therefore, that the rule an-
nounced in Boyd forbidding the forced production of private papers "has long been a rule
searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at
409. The statement of the Court in Boydthat "the fourth and fifth amendments run almost
into each other," 116 U.S. at 630, has caused much debate over the proper interpretation of
the Boyd holding and rationale. See supra note 22.
48. 425 U.S. at 409.
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compelled testimony under the fifth amendment because only the act of
production was compelled, not the creation of the documents themselves.4 9
The Court did acknowledge that the act of production of itself has commu-
nicative aspects because compliance with the subpoena concedes the exist-
ence of the papers, their possession or control by the taxpayer, and the
taxpayer's belief that they are the papers requested.50 The Court reasoned
that such tacit admissions may, in some circumstances, be considered suffi-
ciently testimonial and incriminating to warrant fifth amendment protec-
tion.5 The Court's analysis made clear, however, that the protected
aspects of the compelled production do not include the contents of the
documents.52 The majority opinion in Fisher explicitly refused to answer
the question of whether and to what extent the fifth amendment would
protect private papers from compelled production. 3 The heavy emphasis
on voluntary preparation, however, clearly suggested that private papers
would be subject to the same analysis.5 4
Fisher represented a major shift in fifth amendment interpretation. The
Court paid lip service to the privacy principles underlying the fifth amend-
ment,55 but indicated that only the fourth amendment protects uncompel-
led self-incriminating testimony on privacy grounds.5 6 Thus, the Court
clearly focused its fifth amendment analysis on the technical process of
compulsion. Couch had emphasized the importance of the compulsion re-
49. Id. at 409-10.
50. Id. at 410.
51. Id. The Court noted that the question of whether the tacit admissions inherent in
the act of production warrant fifth amendment protection is one that "perhaps" should be
answered based on the facts of each case rather than categorically. The Court refused to say
explicitly that the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis and did not, there-
fore, rule out the possibility that a categorical answer might be formulated and applied at a
later date. In Fisher the Court concluded that such admissions did not involve testimonial
self-incrimination and, accordingly, were not protected. The Court based that conclusion on
the determination that the government was not relying on any tacit admissions by the tax-
payer because the existence and location of the documents were already known. Id. at 410-
11.
52. Id. at 409-10; see C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.06, at 279; see also Gerstein,
supra note 22, at 379 n. 194 (criticizing the Fisher majority's complete refusal to consider the
character of the documents in determining whether the act of production warrants fifth
amendment protection).
53. 425 U.S. at 414. The issue was not technically before the Court because the tax
records in question were neither prepared by the taxpayer nor in his possession.
54. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.06, at 280; Ritchie, supra note 18, at 395.
55. 425 U.S. at 399.
56. After stating that the fifth amendment protects only compelled testimony regardless
of whether such testimonial evidence is private in nature, the Court in Fisher explained that
only the fourth amendment protects, on privacy grounds, potentially incriminating private
information that does not involve compelled testimony. Id at 400-01. The majority inter-
preted the specific inclusion of privacy interests in the fourth amendment and the lack of
mention of privacy interests in the fifth amendment as evidence of the framers' intent to
protect privacy only by way of the fourth amendment. Id The Court indicated that if the
state proves that probable cause exists and complies with the fourth amendment's specificity
requirements, then the state can properly invade privacy to obtain the evidence. Id. at 400.
Thus, if documents do not fit within the definition of compelled testimony, the state may
obtain them by a subpoena or search warrant properly obtained under the fourth amend-
ment. Fourth amendment compliance forecloses further consideration of privacy issues.
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quirement and Schmerber had confirmed the requirement that in order to
be protected the evidence must be testimonial in nature. Fisher brought
together these two requirements in its mandate that the incriminating testi-
mony be the result of the compulsion exerted by the state. 57 The Fisher
majority concluded that when the documents are created voluntarily, the
only thing compelled is the act of production, which must, therefore, be
testimonial in order to be protected.58 This shift from considering the tes-
timonial content of the documents to considering the testimonial elements
of the act of production was a completely new approach to the analysis of
document production. 59 Both Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan wrote
separate opinions in Fisher to criticize the Court's new approach. Justice
Brennan was extremely dissatisfied with the summary treatment afforded
the "bedrock premise of privacy" 60 and was fearful that the majority's
opinion might foreshadow the end of fifth amendment protection for pri-
vate papers.61 Justice Marshall, while critical of the new theory, expressed
hope that it would provide substantially the same privacy protection as the
traditional content analysis. 62
Two months after the Fisher decision, in Andresen v. Maryland,63 the
Supreme Court refused to grant fifth amendment protection to an attor-
ney's business records seized from his office pursuant to a valid search
warrant.64 The Court reasoned that the petitioner was not asked to say or
do anything to contribute to the state's acquisition of the incriminating
evidence and that, therefore, no compulsion within the meaning of the fifth
amendment existed. 65 The short shrift given to Boyd and the privacy ra-
tionale66 in Andresen continued #shers break with the past and seems to
have eliminated fifth amendment protection for papers obtained in a valid
search and seizure.67 As the Court noted, however, it had previously ad-
dressed the requirement of compulsion directed toward forcing the ac-
cused to contribute actively to the case against him. 68
57. See McKenna, supra note 18, at 66-67; Note, supra note 22, at 972-77.
58. 425 U.S. at 409-10.
59. Id. at 430 (Marshall, J., concurring). For example, the testimonial nature of one's
papers was viewed as sufficient to protect them from compelled production in Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966), and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88
(1974). Fisher was the first case in which the Court held that compelled revelation by the
individual of incriminating testimony found in his records is not protected by the fifth
amendment. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.06, at 279.
60. 425 U.S. at 416 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 415.
62. Id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall reasoned that recognition of the testi-
monial aspects of production, particularly verification of the existence of the documents,
should afford special protection to private papers because it would rarely be valid for the
state to assume the existence of truly private papers. Id. at 432-33.
63. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
64. Id. at 477.
65. Id. at 473-74.
66. Id. at 477.
67. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 473; McKenna, supra note 18, at 60-61. Andresen, like
Fisher, involved business records as opposed to truly private papers. Bradley, supra note 20,
at 473-74.
68. 427 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); see
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Fisher and Andresen significantly reduced the importance of the fifth
amendment's privacy protection by ignoring the testimonial attributes of
the documents themselves and focusing instead on a narrow, technical def-
inition of compulsion.69 Andresen drew a technical distinction between the
compulsion inherent in a subpoena requiring one to produce documents
and the compulsion inherent in a search warrant requiring one to stand
and watch their seizure. 70 Fisher viewed as compelled only testimony cre-
ated simultaneously with the compulsion imposed by the state.7' The
Fisher standard ignored the testimonial contents of preexisting documents
and protected only the testimonial aspects of the act of production. 72
II. UNITED STATES V DOE
In United States v. Doe the Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the
holdings and rationale of Fisher and Andresen. The question facing the
Court in Doe was whether, and to what extent, the fifth amendment pro-
tects the business records of a sole proprietorship. 73 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Powell,74 first recognized that Fisher did not reach the
question of whether the fifth amendment privilege protects the contents of
an individual's records in his possession, 75 but the majority noted that the
rationale in that case was, nevertheless, controlling.76 The Court stated
that the fifth amendment prevents only compelled self-incrimination and,
when the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present with regard to their content. 77 In addition, the Court made it clear
that the contents of documents do not receive any secondary protection
due to the fact that they are requested under a subpoena since a subpoena
ordinarily does not compel an individual to restate, repeat, or affirm that
the documents' contents are true.78
In Doe the Court once again recognized the idea that the fifth amend-
ment should be regarded as a protector of individual privacy shielding per-
sonal records from compelled production while undercutting any practical
effect such an idea might have. The majority opinion essentially begged
Mr. Justice Holmes's quotation from this case, supra note 41); see Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1973); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 194 (1927); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
69. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.06, at 279-80.
70. 427 U.S. at 485, 486 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 41, at 685.
72. Note, supra note 41, at 685; see also Ritchie, supra note 18, at 397 (disregarding the
testimonial nature of private papers artificially distinguishes between compelling a person to
reveal his thoughts by speaking and compelling him to reveal his written thoughts).
73. 104 S. Ct. at 1239, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 556.
74. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined the opinion of the Court.
75. 104 S. Ct. at 1241, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59.
76. Id., 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)). Contrast the restate-
ment referred to here, which might, if present, protect the contents of the documents, with
the tacit compelled testimony inherent in the act of production, which is itself protected, but
does not serve to protect the documents' contents.
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the question by restating the conclusion reached in Fisher that, while the
privilege serves privacy interests, the Court has never, even for the protec-
tion of personal privacy, "applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the
otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view,
did not involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."'79
Citing Schmerber v. California and Andresen v. Maryland as key cases, the
Court reemphasized its gradual move away from the broad policy-based
principles first stated in Boyd v. United States.80 The majority recognized
that although this movement was essentially completed in Fisher, the dif-
ferent courts of appeals had not uniformly applied the reasoning of that
case.8 ' In United States v. Doe the Court left no doubt about the approach
required to apply the privilege to the contents of documents. The Court
applied definitively the reasoning of Fisher, stating that in order for the
contents of documents to be protected, their preparation must be com-
pelled or the person claiming the privilege must be compelled to restate,
repeat, or reaffirm the truth of their contents.8 2 No compulsion exists if the
party asserting the fifth amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the
documents. 83 Because the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the
court of appeals had held that the fifth amendment protected the docu-
ments, it reversed that portion of the court of appeals decision.8 4
Next, the Court considered fifth amendment protection of the act of pro-
ducing the documents in response to a subpoena. The Court restated the
Fisher conclusion that although the contents of a document may not be
privileged, the act of producing the document may be.8 5 The majority re-
peated the Fisher reasoning to the effect that compliance with a subpoena
is potentially self-incriminating testimony because the act of delivery con-
cedes the existence of the papers, their possession or control by the witness,
and the witness's belief that the papers produced are the ones sought. 86
The majority went on to contrast the application and analysis of those ele-
ments of compulsion in Fisher with the facts of Doe.87 The Court in Doe
relied heavily on the district court's finding that the act of producing the
79. 104 S. Ct. at 1241 n.8, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559 n.8 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 399 (1976)).
80. 104 S. Ct. at 1241 n.8, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559 n.8.
81. Id. at 1241-42 & nn.9&10, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559-60 & nn.9&10. See, e.g., In reGrand
Jury Subpoena (Kent), 646 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1981) (fifth amendment protects business
records of a sole proprietorship); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033,
1042-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (fifth amendment protects defendant's personal appointment books
because of rightful expectation of privacy with respect to those papers); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Martinez), 626 F.2d 1051, 1058 (1st Cir. 1980) (subpoena ordering production
of defendant physician's appointment books must be complied with so long as fact of com-
pliance itself not used against defendant); see also Note, supra note 41, at 686-94 (analyzing
the cases cited above).
82. 104 S. Ct. at 1242, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559-60.
83. Id. at 1241, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 559.
84. Id. at 1245, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 563.
85. Id. at 1242, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 560.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1242-43, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 560-61.
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documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 88 In declining to
overturn that finding, which the majority noted was affirmed by the court
of appeals, 89 and in keeping with that finding, the Court held that in this
case the act of producing the documents would have sufficient testimonial
value to warrant fifth amendment protection.90 The Court noted that the
hazards of incrimination must be substantial before a party can claim the
fifth amendment privilege.9 1 The district court's finding indicated that this
was such a case. The Supreme Court pointed out, however, that the gov-
ernment could have rebutted such a finding by producing evidence that
possession, existence, and authentication were a foregone conclusion. 92
The last issue the Court considered was that of use immunity. 93 At both
the district and the appellate court levels the government maintained that
the court should order production of the documents because the govern-
ment promised not to use the witness's act of production against him in
any way. Despite this promise the government refused to comply with the
statutory requirements for formal use immunity. 94 Instead it urged the
Court to impose a form of constructive use immunity that would forbid the
use of the incriminating aspects of the act of production against the person
claiming the privilege despite the lack of formalities.95 The Court refused
to recognize constructive use immunity because to do so would be to ex-
tend unacceptably the jurisdiction of the courts.96 The Court noted that
88. Id. The Court characterized the district court finding as essentially one of fact.
89. Id. at 1243, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 561.
90. Id. at 1245, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 563.
91. Id. at 1243 n.13, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 561 n.13 (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 53 (1968)).
92. 104 S. Ct. at 1243 n.13, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 561 n.13 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
93. An individual may not assert his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination if
no threat of incrimination exists. A governmental grant of use immunity removes the threat
of incrimination by forbidding the use of the immunized testimony and any evidence de-
rived therefrom. The other type of immunity is transactional immunity, which protects the
individual from prosecution for any activity mentioned in the immunized testimony. Use
immunity is the more valuable prosecutor's tool because, while it forbids the use of certain
testimony and evidence, it does not completely bar prosecution. The Supreme Court first
approved the concept of statutes authorizing immunity in 1892 in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), and approved statutory use immunity in Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972). The statutes that detail the procedures required for conferral of use immu-
nity at the federal level are 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1982). See generally C. WHITEBREAD,
supra note 2, § 14.04, at 261-63 (discussing the history of immunity and its effect on the fifth
amendment privilege).
94. In reGrand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981), ajt'd,
680 F.2d 327, 337 (3d Cir. 1982).
95. 104 S. Ct. at 1244, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 562. Apparently, precedent for the type of con-
structive use immunity sought by the government in Doe does not exist. Precedent, how-
ever, can be found for the courts to grant immunity to testimony obtained either in violation
of the witness's fifth amendment rights, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576
(1976), or by a promise of immunity that the witness reasonably believed, but that was not
properly requested by the government, United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1250, 75 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1982); United States v. Soc'y of Indep.
Gasoline Marketers of Am., 624 F.2d 461, 469 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078
(1981).
96. 104 S. Ct. at 1244, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 562. The Court relied heavily on a 1983 decision,
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, which held that new testimony may be compelled only after a new,
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Congress left the decision of whether the grant of use immunity is benefi-
cial in a given case to the prosecutorial discretion of the Justice Depart-
ment.97 Because the Justice Department's case against an individual may
be either helped or hindered by a grant of immunity, the Court decided
that it would not infringe on the Justice Department's right even if invited
to do So.9 8 Should the government want to pursue immunity, the Court
reiterated that the procedures to do so are in place and readily available to
it at any time.99 One critical point that the Court made clear with regard
to use immunity is that because only the act of production is protected,
only the use of testimony inherent in that act must be immunized.'t° The
contents of the documents are not protected because they were not
compelled.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Doe prompted several re-
sponses. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, em-
phatically criticized the majority's decision regarding the nonprivileged
status of the contents of the documents.' 0 ' In Justice Stevens's opinion,
the court of appeals had merely affirmed the district court's holding that
production could not be compelled because the act of production was suffi-
ciently testimonial in nature to warrant fifth amendment protection. 0 2 In
support of his opinion that the court of appeals never held the contents of
the documents privileged, Justice Stevens quoted the court of appeals'
statement that the documents themselves do not contain compelled testi-
mony but the act of production might contain such testimony. '0 3 The ma-
jority noted Justice Stevens's dissent and reemphasized its belief that the
Third Circuit did hold the records themselves privileged.' °4 The majority
pointed out that both parties to the suit agreed with that characterization
of the court of appeals decision. 0 5
formal request for use immunity is granted, despite the fact that the new testimony tracks
prior immunized testimony. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608, 617-18, 74 L. Ed. 2d
430, 444 (1983).
97. 104 S. Ct. at 1244, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 562.
98. Id., 79 L. Ed. 2d at 563.
99. Id. The use immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1982), provides that the
prosecuting United States attorney may request an order requiring an individual to give
testimony or provide information if he refuses to do so based on his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. The United States attorney may request such an order when he
believes that the information or testimony is necessary to the public interest. Id. § 6003.
Section 6002 provides that when such an order has been issued, the individual must give the
required information or testimony and that any information so provided may not be used
against the individual in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury. Id. § 6002.
100. 104 S. Ct. at 1244 n.17, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 563 n.17.
101. Id. at 1246-48, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 564-67.
102. Id. at 1247, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 565.
103. Id., 79 L. Ed. 2d at 565-66. Despite the language quoted by Justice Stevens, one
could argue that the court of appeals' holding was based in part on the belief that the docu-
ments were privileged. The Third Circuit spent a lengthy portion of its opinion discussing
not only the relationship between the documents of a sole proprietorship and personal pa-
pers, 680 F.2d at 330, but also its belief that, despite Fisher, the fifth amendment protects the
contents of private papers and business records of a sole proprietorship. Id. at 331-34.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1240 n.6, 1245 n.18, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 558 n.6, 563 n.18.
105. Id. at 1240 n.6, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 558 n.6.
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Justice O'Connor and Justice Marshall also wrote separately in dispa-
rate opinions that reflect their authors' different interpretations of the pur-
pose of the fifth amendment. Justice O'Connor wrote a brief concurrence
to clarify the point she perceived to be only implied in the majority's opin-
ion: that the fifth amendment provides "absolutely no protection" for the
contents of any private papers.106 This assertion is supported by the shift
in the Court's focus, as reflected in Fisher and Andresen and confirmed in
Doe, from a focus on the nature and content of documents to a focus on
testimony inherent in the action compelled.10 7 Justice Marshall's opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, was joined by Justice Brennan
and essentially mirrored Justice Stevens's concerns.' 0 8 Justice Marshall
challenged Justice O'Connor's assertion that the fifth amendment does not
extend to private papers of any kind.10 9 He asserted that the majority
opinion did not reconsider whether the fifth amendment provides protec-
tion for the contents of private papers" 10 and pointed out that the docu-
ments involved in Doe were business records involving a lesser concern for
privacy than truly private papers such as personal diaries. " ' I He reiterated
his belief that certain documents should not be required to be produced at
the government's request." 12
Despite the fact that Doe did not involve private papers of a personal
nature, Justice O'Connor is correct to the extent that the Court has set up
the mechanism to refuse fifth amendment protection to such highly per-
sonal writings as private diaries. The fundamental ethical problems in-
volved in allowing the government access to such papers for the purpose of
using them against the individual in criminal proceedings, however, re-
main unaddressed." 3 Although the Court has hinted that such papers
might be protected on alternative bases,"14 it has not clearly stated or de-
106. Id. at 1245, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 563.
107. See supra notes 69-72, 81-83, and accompanying texts.
108. Id. at 1245-46, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 564.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1245, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 564.
111. Id. at 1246, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 564.
112. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 431-32 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
113. See Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fisher, in which he stated:
An individual's books and papers are generally little more than an extension
of his person. They reveal no less than he could reveal upon being questioned
directly. Many of the matters within an individual's knowledge may as easily
be retained within his head as set down on a scrap of paper. I perceive no
principle which does not permit compelling one to disclose the contents of
one's mind but does permit compelling the disclosure of the contents of that
scrap of paper by compelling its production. Under a contrary view, the con-
stitutional protection would turn on fortuity, and persons would, at their peril,
record their thoughts and the events of their lives. The ability to think private
thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve inti-
mate memories would be curtailed through fear that those thoughts or the
events of those memories would become the subjects of criminal sanctions
however invalidly imposed.
425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976).
114. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 392, 401 (1976), the Court listed other potential
protections for private papers. Those protections are as follows: (1) fourth amendment
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NOTES
veloped such alternative protections. In both Fisher and Andresen the
Court specifically noted that the documents involved were business rather
than private papers. In Doe the Court worded its holding to apply to busi-
ness records." 15 No Supreme Court majority opinion has yet expressly de-
nied fifth amendment protection to truly private incriminating papers, but
neither has the Court offered a rationale for how private papers could be
protected that is consistent with the emphasis on compulsion. 16
III. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Doe the Supreme Court held that although the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination does not protect the contents
of the sole proprietorship's business records, it may protect the act of pro-
ducing those records in response to a subpoena. The Court based its find-
ing in Doe that the act of production was sufficiently testimonial to warrant
fifth amendment protection largely on the district court's finding of fact to
that effect. The Court, however, made clear how very narrow such protec-
tion can be when it instructed that a grant of use immunity, immunizing
only the testimonial aspects of the act of production, will require produc-
tion of the papers sought, the contents of which will remain completely
unprotected. The Court's dismissal of respondent Doe's reliance on the
privacy basis of the fifth amendment washed away the last vestiges of
United States v. Boyd's long-standing idea that protection of privacy lies
close to the heart of the fifth amendment. In its place the Court reiterated
the rationale of Fisher v. United States, with its heavy emphasis on the
conclusion that the fifth amendment does not protect voluntarily prepared
documents because their contents are not compelled. This focus on the
process of compulsion instead of the nature of the document's contents
would not seem to support a content-based distinction giving protection to
private papers but not to business papers. Nevertheless, because neither
the facts nor the Court's opinion directly preclude it, the Court could draw
such a distinction in the future.
Kathleen Maloney
protection against unreasonable or overly broad searches; (2) the first amendment; and
(3) evidentiary privileges. Id.; see supra note 56. Commentators also have suggested that
private papers are protected from forced disclosure by the first and fourth amendments. See
McKenna, supra note 18 at 67-72; Note, supra note 41, at 694-702.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 1241, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 559-60.
116. See Note, supra note 22, at 947.
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